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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
GLEN H. WHITEHOUSE, 
Petitioner/Appellant, 
vs. 
FRED C. SCHWENDIMAN, CHIEF, 
DRIVER LICENSE SERVICES, 
DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY, 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Defendant/Respondent. 
Case No. 20669 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
The issue on appeal is whether or not a driver having 
been arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol after 
having once refused to take the chemical test can recant his 
refusal within a reasonable time. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
For purposes of this expedited appeal, appellant, 
will not contest that the South Salt Lake police officer had 
probable cause to place him under arrest for violation of 
§41-6-44 U.C.A. as amended (DUI). He was arrested in South 
Salt Lake August 22, 1984 (T. 2) at 10:10 p.m. (T. 16). After 
certain field tests he was transported to the South Salt Lake 
Police Station where a breath test was requested. 
For purposes of this appeal appellant does not 
contest the adequacy of the warning by the arresting officer 
of the possible consequences for refusing to submit to a 
chemical test of the officer's choosing. 
By way of factual background the following evidence 
is directed to the Court's attention. 
(T. 12, lines 2-7) 
A: Then I believe Sgt. Gillette asked him 
again, "You're not going to take the test?" 
And he said, "No, I am not." 
And Sgt. Gillette made some comment about, 
"Thanks for wasting my time," and shut the 
machine down and left the office. 
(T. 12, lines 8-22) 
Q: Now, Officer, did Mr. Whitehouse ever make 
any further request that the test be 
readmmistered to nim? 
A: Yes, sir, he did. 
Q: Could you tell us the time element there 
and who was present and what was said? 
A: The only two present were myself and Mr. 
Whitehouse. It was approximately three to 
five minutes after Sgt. Gillette left that 
Mr. Whitehouse expressed his desire to 
take the test. I refused to allow him and 
I believe I explained that that would 
involve Sgt. Gillette coming back and 
turning on the machine and going through 
the same processes again. And that he had 
refused once, and I believe statutorily 
that was mentioned. 
(T. 16, lines 3-21) 
Q: Okay. You started preparing the report at 
10:25 at, where, the police station? 
-2-
Yes, sir. 
So that puts Gillette at arrived about 
10:30? 
Approximately, yes, sir. 
And Gillette is there about how long 
before he leaves? 
Probably ten minutes. 
And within four minutes after Gillette 
leaves the driver says, "i will take the 
test"? 
Yes, sir. 
Gillette is still on duty? 
Yes, sir. 
Any other officers on duty? 
Yes, sir. 
That are certified to operate the machine? 
I believe Officer Davis, who assisted me 
in the arrest, but I am not sure of that. 
(T. 17, lines 2-25) 
I believe you testified in another 
proceeding on the way to the jail he again 
wanted to take the test? 
Yes, sir, I believe he did at that point. 
And by the time you arrived at the Salt 
Lake County Jail, did you offer him the 
test, wnich — at the machine located 
there? 
No, sir. 
And so twice, once with Gillette on duty 
within three or four minutes, on the way 
to the Salt Lake County Jail, he again 
-3-
wanted to take the test, and you did not 
offer him a test again; is that correct? 
A: That's correct. 
Q: Now, going to the last page of your 
report, it's signed by Gary Gillette, your 
sergeant; is that correct? 
A: Yes, sir. 
Q: That signing is at 2330, which is 11:30? 
A: Yes, sir. 
Q: That would be approximately an hour and 
ten minutes after he was stopped? 
A: Yes, sir. 
(T. 18, lines 12-16) 
Q: And this is 2320 after you returned to 
Salt Lake an hour and 20 minutes after you 
completed tne stop, completed your report 
sworn to it before Gillette, who is a 
notary public? 
A: Yes, sir. 
For purposes of this brief appellant not having 
raised the issue at the lower court does not either directly 
or Dy inference question tne validity of the notarization of 
the arresting officer's affidavit by a sergeant of the same 
police agency. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Appellant submits that his subsequent agreeing to 
take the breath test within a reasonable time after his arrest 
and without evidence of undue delay effecting the validity of 
the test results or hardships on the police, a prior refusal 
can be withdrawn. 
-4-
ARGUMENT 
The brief transcript reveals no facts in dispute. 
The question of withdrawing a refusal has been dealt with by 
many courts. The most cited case for this proposition is Lund 
v. Hjelle, 224 N.W.2d 552 (N.D. 1974). In that case Lund was 
arrested at 8:30 p.m. following an accident. He was duly 
advised of the repercussions of refusing to submit to a 
chemical test after his refusal to submit to the requested 
test. At 9:30 p.m. Lund requested the opportunity to submit 
to a chemical test which was denied by the arresting officer. 
In sustaining the district court's reversal of the actions of 
the State Highway Commissioner, the Supreme Court of North 
Dakota stated as follows: 
[6-9] The purpose of Chapter 39-20, N.D.C.C., 
the Implied Consent Lawf is to eliminate the 
drunken driver from the highways by requiring 
drivers suspected of operating motor vehicles 
while under the influence of intoxicating 
liquor to submit to a chemical test to 
determine the alcoholic content of their 
blood. Since the accuracy of a chemical test 
under Cnapter 39-20 does not depend upon its 
being administered immediately after an arrest, 
accident or other event, and thus a delay for a 
reasonable period of time while an arrested 
person considers or reconsiders a decision 
whether or not to submit to a chemical test 
will not frustrate the object of the 
Legislature in enacting Chapter 39-20, we hold 
that where, as here, one who is arrested for 
driving under the influence of intoxicating 
liquor first refuses to submit to a chemical 
test to determine the alcoholic content of his 
blood and later changes his mind and requests a 
chemical blood test, the subsequent consent to 
take the test cures the prior first refusal 
when the request to take the test is made 
-5-
within a reasonable time after the prior first 
refusal; when such a test administered upon the 
subsequent consent would still be accurate; 
when testing equipment or facilities are still 
readily available; when honoring a request for 
a test, following a prior first refusal, will 
result in no substantial inconvenience or 
expense to the police; and when the individual 
requesting the test has been m police custody 
and under observation for the whole time since 
his arrest. At 557. 
Support for this proposition was noted in R. Donigan, Chemical 
Tests and the Law (2d ed. 1966): 
Thus, from the known length of elapsed time 
between the taking of the specimen for analysis 
and the event in issue, the known rate of 
average elimination of blood alcohol in the 
average person, and the result of the chemical 
test in the particular case, experts in this 
field can arrive by the process of 
extrapolation at a fairly reasonable estimate 
of the percentage of blood alcohol in the 
average person at the time of a certain event 
if he had the quantity of alcohol in his blood 
as shown by the chemical test in the case on 
trial. 
The same reasoning was codified in §41-6-44.5(2) . 
Other cases in accord are Zahtila v. Motor Vehicle Division, 
560 P.2d 847 (Colo. App. 1977). In that case Zahtila refused 
•*• (2) If the chemical test was taken within two 
hours of the alleged driving or actual physical control, the 
blood alcohol level of the person at the time of the alleged 
driving or actual physical control shall be presumed to be not 
less than the level of the alcohol determined to be in the 
blood by the chemical test. 
-6-
a blood test and twenty-five (25) minutes afterwards 
reconsidered his decision and requested a test. The Colorado 
Supreme Court stated as follows: 
While a motorist has no right under the statute 
to confer with counsel prior to deciding 
whether he will consent to a test, Calvert v. 
Motor Vehicle Division, supra, where, as here, 
he is permitted to do so, tnereafter consents 
to the test, and the officer is available to 
see that the test is administered, the primary 
purpose of the statute is fulfilled unless the 
delay will materially affect the result of the 
test. At 849. 
The Hawaii Supreme Court in State v. Moore, 614 P. 2d 
931 (Hawaii 1980) adopting this rule also citing Zahtila and 
Hjelie, supra, stated: 
We adopt the criteria of the North Dakota 
Supreme Court. We hold that unless a delay 
would materially affect the test results or 
prove substantially inconvenient to administer, 
a subsequent consent may cure a prior refusal 
to be tested. At 935. 
In Gaunt v. Motor Vehicle Division, 666 P.2d 524 
(Ariz.App. 1983) adopting the Zahtila, Moore and Hjelie and 
recognizing that tnere is a majority and minority position 
stated as follows: 
We find the so-called miniority rule to be 
"more logical and fair." (citation omitted) 
Although an absolute rule preventing a 
subsequent consent after an initial refusal has 
the advantage of granting unmistakable clarity 
to the defendant's obligation under the implied 
consent , law, it could lead to unnecessarily 
harsh and self-defeating results. It is not 
hard to imagine circumstances where the 
defendant, soon after declining to take the 
breath test, has second thoughts. If the test 
results would remain valid, and if no material 
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inconvenience is caused to the police, we fail 
to see the harm in permitting the defendant to 
subsequently consent to take the test. 
The breath test results could be an 
essential part of the state's case against the 
arrested motorist (or part of motorist's 
defense). By approving a flexible rule we 
believe that this important evidence will be 
more frequently available and therefore the 
prophylactic purpose of the implied consent law 
will be achieved. At 527. 
See also Sedlacek v. Pearson, 284 N.W.2d 556 (Nebraska 1979). 
In view of South Dakota v. Neville, 459 US 553, 74 
L.Ed.2d 748, 103 S.Ct. 916, and §41-6-44.10(8) U.C.A. as 
2 
amended , appellant's refusal to submit to a chemical test 
is admissible in any civil or criminal trial. 
We are dealing with a civil standard for forfeiture 
of driver's privileges. Therefore in applying for a license, 
a driver impliedly agrees to submit to a chemical test if 
arrested for driving under the influence. He thereby consents 
2
 (8) If a person under arrest refuses to submit 
to a chemical test or tests under the provisions of this 
section, evidence of refusal shall be admissible in any civil 
or criminal action or proceeding arising out of acts alleged 
to have oeen committed while the person was driving or in 
actual physical control of a motor vehicle while under the 
influence of alcohol or any drug or combination of alcohol and 
any drug. 
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to a validly obtained test result be used against him in a 
criminal proceeding, or he permits evidence of refusal to be 
introduced for what evidentiary inferences may exist. This 
constitutes a forfeiture of one of two rights. In view of the 
forfeiture of a right, a reasonable analogy to that forfeiture 
can be found in standard Uniform Real Estate Contract 
liquidated damage clauses. This Court has repeatedly held 
since Perkins v. Spencer, 121 Ut. 468, 243 P.2d 446 (1952) 
that it disfavors forfeitures. It is undisputed law that a 
drivers license is a "protectable property interest". Mackey 
v. Montrym, 443 U.S. 1, 61 L.Ed.2d 321, 99 S.Ct. 2612 at 329. 
Therefore if forfeitures of money are treated in disfavor it 
would be only reasonable to apply a more fair standard in 
determining if a person has in fact refused to submit to a 
chemical test. 
CONCLUSION 
Since appellant within minutes of his refusal to 
submit to a chemical test requested the test be given while a 
test was still available, and again requested the test be 
given while in route to the Salt Lake County Jail where a 
machine was available, the refusal to provide him with an 
©pportunity to submit to (at least) a breathilizer test was 
unreasonable. Appellant submits that the action of the 
respondent - in revoking his driving privileges when the entire 
period from first viewing appellant (10:10 p.m.), transporting 
-9-
him to the South Salt Lake Police Station, thereafter to the 
Salt Lake County Jail for booking, and the arresting officer 
returning to his station completing his DUI report form 
(Exhibit 1) and having the same approved and notarized at 
11:30 p.m. by the same officer who came to the station to 
administer the test constitutes arbitrary and capricious 
acts. The District Court should be reversed and appellant's 
license reinstated. 
Respectfully submitted this J2^2 da¥ of (£ ts^iSL^j 
1985. 
McRAE & DeLAND 
ROBERT M. McRAE 
Attorney for Appellant 
209 East 100 Nortn 
Vernal, Utah 84078 
(801) 789-1666 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I do hereby certify that I caused to be hand-
delivered four true and correct copies of the foregoing Brief 
of Appellant to Bruce M. Hale, Assistant Attorney General, 236 
State Capitol Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 on 
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DAVID L. WILKINSON (#3472) 
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T e l e p h o n e : 533-7606 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
GLEN H. WHITEHOUSE, 
P e t i t i o n e r , 
v s . 
FRED C. SCHNENDIMAN, Chief, 
Driver License Services, 
Department of Public Safety, 
State of Utah, 
Respondent* 
The above-entitled matter having come before the 
Court, being regularly scheduled for trial de novo on February 
27, 19 85, the parties being represented by counsel and the 
arresting officer being present, and the parties having made 
proffers of proof and stipulations and being accepted by the 
Court and the-Court being apprised in the premises, the Court 
makes the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1) The testimony preponderates that the officer had 
cause to and did arrest the petitioner. 
FINDINGS OF FACT, 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
AND ORDER 
Case No. C84-6217 
2) The p e t i t i o n e r was p r o p e r l y r eques t ed t o t ake a 
chemical t e s t , pu r suan t t o Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44 .10 (1953) 
a s amendedf and warned of t h e consequences i f t h e r e was a 
r e f u s a l and t h e machine was shut down. 
3) That p e t i t i o n e r unders tood he would l o s e h i s 
d r i v i n g p r i v i l e g e for one y e a r , and d id no t immediately a f t e r 
r e f u s i n g r e q u e s t t h e t e s t . 
The Cour t , having made t h e fo rego ing F ind ings of 
F a c t , now makes i t s : 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1) Pursuan t t o Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44 .10 (1953) a s 
amended, and a l l e lements t h e r e o f be ing complied w i t h , t h e 
p e t i t i o n e r having re fused t o submit t o a chemical t e s t , t he 
p e t i t i o n should be den ied . 
2) The c i rcumstance and u n c o n t r a d i c t e d t e s t imony 
show t h a t p e t i t i o n e r d id not make an "immediate" r e q u e s t for 
t h e o f f i c e r ' s t e s t . 
O R D E R 
The Court having made t h e fo rego ing F ind ings of Fact 
and Conc lus ions of Law, 
IT IS HEREBY ADJUDGED, ORDERED AND DECREED t h a t 
1) The p e t i t i o n i s den i ed . 
2) The p e t i t i o n e e s d r i v i n g p r i v i l e g e s be revoked 
p u r s u a n t t o Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44 .10 (1953) a s amended. 
DATED this _I_^ L_L_ day of 1 I Si ,r{ 1985. 
HONORABLE RAYMOND S. UNO 
District Court Judge 
MAILING GERTIFIC&IS 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order was 
mailed, first class, postage prepaid, to the following on this 
JZL2J? &rv of March, 1SE5: 
Robert K. KcRae 
Attorney at Lav7 
209 East 100 North 
Vernal, Utah 8407 8 
uii\m(Makir^ 
TRAFFIC RULES AND REGULATIONS 41-6-44.10 
41-6-44.5. Admissibility of chemical test results in actions for driving under 
the influence or with a prohibited blood alcohol content — Weight. (1) In any 
action or proceeding in which it is material to prove that a person was driving 
or in actual physical control of a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol or 
with a blood alcohol content ef .10% or greater statutorily prohibited, the results 
of a chemical test or tests as authorized in section 41-6-44.10 shall be admissible 
as evidence. 
(2) If the chemical test was taken within two hours of the alleged driving or 
actual physical control, the blood alcohol level of the person at the time of the 
alleged driving or actual physical control shall be presumed to be not less than 
the level of the alcohol determined to be in the blood by the chemical test. 
(3) If the chemical test was taken more than two hours after the alleged driving 
or actual physical control, the test result shall be admissible as evidence of the 
person's blood alcohol level at the time of the alleged driving or actual physical 
control, but the trier of fact shall determine what weight shall be given to the 
result of the test. 
(4) The foregoing provisions of this section shall not be construed fts limiting 
the consideration or application by the trier ef faet ef the presumptions set forth 
fa section 41-6-44, nor shall they prevent a court from receiving otherwise admissi-
ble evidence as to a defendant's blood alcohol level at the time of the alleged driv-
ing or actual physical control. 
History: C. 1953, 41-6-44.5, enacted by L. 
1979, ch. 243, § 3; L. 1983, ch. 99, § 15. 
41-6-44.8. Municipal attorneys authorized to prosecute for driving while 
license suspended or revoked. Alleged violations of section 41-2-28, which consist 
of the j i -c i Jnvihg while, his opors'-i^ or chauffeur's license is suspended or 
revol'ul -oi r- vloktion of ^cjion 41-0-44, a local ordinance which complies with 
the requirements of section 41-6-43, section 41-6-44.10, section 76-5-207, or a crimi-
nal prcliihiii.:. iiiii the person was charged with violating as a result of a plea 
bargain ifL;; L- vm^ ben. criminally charged wiih violating one of more of those 
sc-ctionr .T . "• *•• •.. .• *-.. L^ y )>*. j r. v-r-iiv: b\ ati^rneys of cities and towns as well 
as by pU'.;'j' -ituii. who aie empowered elsewhere in this code to prosecute those 
alleged violations. 
attorneys of cities and towns to prosecute 
those alleged violations. 
This act enacts section 41-G-44.S. Utah 
Code Annotated 1953. - Laws 1983, eh. 102. 
41-6-44.10, Implied consent to chemical tests for alcohol or drug — Refusal 
to allow — Warning, report, revocation of license — Court action on revoca-
tion — Person incapable of refusal — Results of test available — Who may 
give test — Evidence, fa) £1) Any person oftesaliftg a motor vehicle in this state 
shall be deemed to have given his consent to a chemical test or tests of his breath, 
blood, or urine for the purpose of determining whether he was driving or in actual 
physical control of a motor vehicle while having a blood alcohol content statutorily 
prohibited, or while under the influence of alcohol, any drug, or combination of 
alcohol and any drug as detailed in section 41-6-44, provided thtrt s«eh so long as 
the test is or tests are administered at the direction of a peace officer having 
gmmmdM'afa&G&i&e stteh that person to have been driving or in actual physical con-
trol of a motor vehicle while having a blood alcohol content statutorily prohibited, 
or while under the influence of alcohol, any drug, or combination of alcohol and 
History: C. 1953, 41-6-44.8, enacted by L. 
1983, ch. 102, §1. 
Title of Act. 
An art relating to prosecution of alleged 
violations of section 41-2-28, empowering city 
67 
41-6-44.10 MOTOR VEHICLES 
any drug as detailed in section 41-6-44. A peace officer shall determine which of 
the aforesaid tests shaTTbe administered. 
No person; who has been requested pursuant to under this section to submit to 
a chemical test or tests of his breath, blood, or urine, shall have the right to select 
the test or tests to be administered. The failure or inability of a peace officer to 
arrange for any specific test shall is not be a defense with regard to taking a test 
requested by a peace officer ftor an? it shall not be a defense in any criminal, civil 
or administrative proceeding resulting from a person's refusal to submit to the 
requested test or tests. 
(b) (2) If saeh the person has been placed under aiyaast and has thereafter been 
i^juestgd by a peace officer to submit to any one or more of the chemical tests 
provided for in subsection (a) (1} of this section and »af4^es to submit to sueh the 
chemical test or tests, s«eh the person sfea^te^ww'Wtgtl by a peace officer requesting 
the test or tests that a refusal to submit to the test or tests can result in revocation 
of his license to operate a motor vehicle. Following this warning, unless s«eh the 
person immediately requests the chemical test or tests as offered by a peace officer 
be administered, no test shall be given and a peace officer shall submit a £wgrn 
•GP-Stfi within five days after the date of the arrest, that he had grounds to believe 
the arrested person had been driving or was in actual physical control of a motor 
vehicle while having a blood alcohol content statutorily prohibited or while under 
the influence of alcohol or any drug or combination of alcohol and any drug as 
detailed in section 41-6-44 and that the person had refused to submit to a chemical 
test or tests as set forth in subsection ftr) (Y) of this section. Within 2G-days after 
receiving a sworn report from a peace officer to the effect that mreh the person 
has refused a chemical iezt or tests the department shall notify streh the person 
of a hearing l\iwh the c^,: rnnent. If ai r~ ^ tV t he? :?-g the department deter-
mines that the person v^s granted the ri^Li to submit to a chemical test or tests 
and refused to submit to s-&eh the test or tests, or if st*eh the person fails to appear 
before the department as required in the notice, the department shall revoke for 
one year hi<? license or permit to drive. The department shall also assess against 
the person, in addition to any fee imposed under subsection 41-2-8 (?)., a £t_e of $25, 
which must be paid before the person's driving privilege is reinstated, to cover 
administrative costs, and which fee shall be cancelled if the person obtains an 
unappealed court decision following a proceeding allowed under this subsection that 
the revocation was not proper. Any person whose license has been revoked by the 
department under the provisions of this section shall have the right to file a peti-
tion within 30 days thereafter for a hearing in the matter in the district court 
in the county in which stteh the perse- s^H fesitk resides, feeh The court is 
hereby vested with jurisdiction, and it shall be its dtrty *e set the matter for trial 
de novo upon 10-days' written notice to the department and thereupon to take testi-
mony and examine into the facts of the case and to determine whether the 
petitioner's license is subject to revocation under the provisions of this aet chapter. 
(e) (3) Any person who is dead, unconscious, or in any other condition rendering 
him incapable of refusal to submit to any such chemical test or tests shall be 
deemed not to have withdrawn the consent provided for in subsection (a-) (1) of 
this section, and the test or tests may be administered whether such person has 
been arrested or not. 
(4) (4) Upon the request of the person who was tested, the results of such test 
or tests shall be made available to him. 
(e) (5) Only a physician, registered nurse, practical nurse or person authorized 
under subsection 26-1-30 (19), acting at the request of a peace officer can withdraw 
blood for the purpose of determining the alcoholic or drug content therein. This 
limitation shall not apply to the taking of a urine or breath specimen. Any physi-
cian, registered nurse, practical nurse or person authorized under subsection 
26-1-30 (19) who, at the direction of a peace officer, draws a sample of blood from 
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any person whom a peace officer has reason to believe is driving in violation of 
this chapter, or hospital or medical facility at which such sample is drawn, shall 
be immune from any civil or criminal liability arising therefrom, provided such 
test is administered according to standard medical practice. 
£f) (6) The person to be tested may, at his own expense, have a physician of 
his own choosing administer a chemical test in addition to the test or tests admin-
istered at the direction of a peace officer. The failure or inability to obtain such 
additional test shall not affect admissability of the results of the test or tests taken 
at the direction of a peace officer, nor preclude nor delay the test or tests to be 
taken at the direction of a peace officer. Such additional test shall be subsequent 
to the test or tests administered at the direction of a peace officer. 
(g) (7) For the purpose of determining whether to submit to a chemical test 
or tests, the person to be tested shall not have the right to consult an attorney 
nor shall such a person be permitted to have an attorney, physician or other person 
present as a condition for the taking of any test. 
W (8) If a person under arrest refuses to submit to a chemical test or tests 
under the provisions of this section, evidence of refusal shall be admissible in any 
civil or criminal action or proceeding arising out of acts alleged to have been com-
mitted while the person was driving or in actual physical control of a motor vehicle 
while under the influence of alcohol or any drug or combination of alcohol and any 
drug. 
History: C. 1953, 41-6-44.10, enacted by L. occupants. Garcia v. Schwendiman (1982) 645 
1981, ch. 126, § 43; L. 1983, ch. 99, § 16. P 2d 651. 
Actual physical control. Proceeding to revoke license for failure to 
To establish actual physical control of a submit to test. 
vehicle for purposes of this section, it is Driver's license revocation proceeding for 
unnecessary to show actual intent to control failure to submit to a requested chemical test 
the vehicle; intent to control a vehicle may be requires proof only by a preponderance of 
inferred from the performance of those acts the evidence. Garcia v. Schwendiman (1982; 
which constitute actual physical control. 645 P 2d 651. 
Garcia v. Schwendiman (1982) 645 P 2d 651. At a proceeding to revoke a driver's license 
There was an adequate showing that for failure to submit to a requested chemical 
motorist was in actual physical control of a test, department of public safety has the bui-
motor vehicle where motorist occupied the den to show arrested person was driving or 
driver's position behind the steering wheel of in actual physical control of a motor vehicle 
a motor vehicle with possession of the igni- in addition to showing that the arresting 
tion key and with apparent ability to start officer had grounds to believe that the 
and move the vehicle; fact that vehicle was arrested person was under the influence; the 
blocked by a fence and another vehicle and same evidentiary burden must be met in a 
could be moved only a few feet did not pre- trial de novo in the district court. Garcia v. 
elude a finding of actual physical control. Schwendiman (1982) 645 P 2d 651. 
Garcia v. Schwendiman (1982) 645 P 2d 651. 
The "actual physical control" language of ^aw Reviews. 
this section should be read as intending to Hansen v. Owens — Expansion of the Priv-
prevent intoxicated drivers from entering ilege against Self-incrimination to Unknown 
their vehicles except as passengers or passive Limits, 1981 Utah L. Rev. 447. 
41-6-44.30. Seizure and impoundment of vehicles by category I peace offi-
cers. The legislature finds that it is contrary to the safety of the public to leave 
vehicles unattended on public roads. 
(1) If a category I peace officer arrests or cites the driver of a vehicle for violat-
ing sections 41-6-43, 41-6-44, 41-6-44.2, or 41-6-44.10, the officer shall seize and 
-impound the vehicle. 
(2) Any such officer who impounds a vehicle under this section shall remove, 
or cause the vehicle to be removed, to the nearest accessible state impound yard 
that meets the standards set by rule by the state department of motor vehicles, 
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